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AUSTRALIAN INVESTORS’ HOME BIAS IN PORTFOLIO EQUITY 
INVESTMENT 
 
1 Introduction 
The traditional international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) predicts that investors should hold equities from countries 
around the world in proportion to each market’s capitalisation. However, empirical 
facts suggest that international portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets 
(French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner (1995), 
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). This phenomenon is known as the “home bias 
puzzle”. For instance, the actual domestic equity holdings of Australia and New 
Zealand in 2002 were 78.08% and 81.67% respectively, whereas the ICAPM 
benchmark percentages were 1.84 and 0.10 respectively.  
 
The empirical investigation into the home bias puzzle is important for several reasons. 
First, globalization in general has increased capital mobility and foreign equity 
investments (Obstfeld, 1995). The identification of the relevance of capital market 
frictions promoting home bias give further insight into the future changes in portfolios. 
Second, the ongoing integration process in the European Union is likely to lead a 
change in its portfolio composition due to the joining of the Eastern European 
countries. The financial integration process will also affect the international portfolio 
equity composition. Third, the severe demographic changes in the European countries 
and Japan are likely to lead to a change in the capital flows. It is important for the 
estimation and prediction of future investments to know more about the effect of 
capital market frictions and the extent of capital mobility. Fourth, due to the lack of 
data on cross border holdings, the home bias puzzle is not fully explored. Due to lack 
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of accurate holdings data, researchers have greatly underestimated foreign portfolio 
positions, which greatly hampered the analysis of home bias. This paper fills the gap 
by employing the recent International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on bilateral equity holdings. Fifth, country specific 
studies on home bias, are either limited to US foreign equity holdings or focus on 
countries’ foreign equity holdings not subdivided into country pairs. There are no 
studies focussing on portfolio equity home bias in the Australian context. This paper 
fills in the gap by empirically investigating the phenomenon of home bias in the 
Australian context, using high quality IMF dataset. This paper empirically investigates 
the home bias puzzle by analysing the role of direct barriers to investment viz. capital 
controls and transaction costs; indirect barriers based on information asymmetries 
including legal barriers; and control variables viz. trade links.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides literature review of the home 
bias puzzle. Section 3 outlines the empirical framework and model. Section 4 refers to 
the data and describes the various explanatory variables employed in the model. 
Section 5 presents stylized facts about the home bias puzzle. The results are presented 
in section 6 and finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) develop a two country capital market equilibrium model 
where there are barriers to cross border investment and these barriers can be considered 
as tax on net foreign investment. This tax represents various kinds of barriers to 
international investment such as direct controls on the import or export of capital, 
possibility of expropriation of foreign holdings, reserve requirements on bank deposits 
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and other assets held by foreigners, restrictions on the fraction of business that is 
owned by foreigners. It may also include barriers due to information asymmetries i.e. 
unfamiliarity of residents of one country with the stock markets of other countries. 
Merton (1987) develops a model where investors hold stocks that they know. In this 
model, investors think that the risk of stocks they do not know is extremely high. 
Accordingly, the investors may overweight domestic stocks. Cooper and Lessard 
(1981) develop an international capital market equilibrium model which allows for 
differential taxes on foreign investment depending on the country of investment and 
the origin of investor. They obtain unique solutions for taxes under extreme 
assumptions that taxes depend on the country of investment, or on the origin of 
investor. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) find that hedging against inflation risk cannot 
explain the home bias.   
 
Several papers consider the effect of indirect barriers i.e. information asymmetries on 
equity investment and home bias. French and Poterba (1991), for instance, find that 
information asymmetry can generate the same observed portfolio patterns as if 
investors expect the domestic returns to be several hundred basis points higher than the 
returns in foreign markets. Gehrig (1993) uses a noisy rational expectations model to 
investigate the effect of asymmetric information between domestic and foreign 
investors. Investors observe noisy signals with different degrees of precision. The 
domestic investors receive signals of future returns that are more precise. The investors 
remain incompletely informed, even in equilibrium. Domestic bias arises from better 
investor information about domestic stocks. Thus, on average foreign investments 
appear to be more risky. Hasan and Simaan (2000) derive the premium that an investor 
is willing to pay to buy the full information of the mean return vector and show that 
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rational investors prefer home country dominated portfolios over diversified portfolios 
if the variability of estimation errors far exceeds the variability of the mean return 
vector.  
 
There are several papers investigating the home bias puzzle related to individual 
countries viz. Japan (Kang and Stulz (1997)), Sweden (Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001)), Korea (Kim and Wei (2002)) and United States (Ahearne et al (2004), 
Dahlquist et al (2003)). But absent from these is a study related to home bias in the 
Australian context. This paper fills in the gap by empirically investigating the home 
bias puzzle in the Australian context. 
 
3. Modelling Home Bias 
This paper employs a model which is derived from Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The 
model is based on the presumption that investors face both explicit costs (transaction 
fees, taxes, commissions, and the costs of gathering information) and implicit costs 
(extra risk of expropriation and information gathering costs incurred by foreign 
investors in investing abroad). This paper employs the following empirical 
specification, 
 
 εβα ++= jtij XBIAS ,                     (1) 
where 
tijBIAS ,  is the degree of country s investors’ home bias against country  i.e. the 
deviation from ICAPM benchmark defined as one minus the ratio of the share of 
foreign equities in the source country and world portfolios.  is a vector of 
independent variables that includes country s investment share of its market 
'i j
jX
'j
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capitalisation in country , ; trade between country i and ,  index of 
capital control for the country , ;  is the optimal share of investment 
in the ICAPM with perfect markets; Tran is the transaction cost that country i has to 
incur inorder to invest in country ; legal indices based on La Porta et al (1998) and 
Kaufmann et al (2003). 
i tjINV , j ;Trade
j tjRstrict ,
theor
tjW ,
j
 
4 Data Description 
One of the major problems in the home bias research has been relatively poor quality 
of cross border holdings estimates. In the past, the cross border holdings were 
estimated using accumulated capital flows and valuation adjustments (Tesar and 
Werner (1995)). Warnock and Cleaver (2002) show that capital flows data are ill suited 
to estimate bilateral holdings. This paper employs the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF’s) Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on bilateral equity 
holdings for the years 2001 and 2003. CPIS reports data on foreign portfolio asset 
holdings (divided into equity, long term debt, and short term debt) by residence of 
issuer. In 1997, IMF conducted the first CPIS wherein 29 countries participated; the 
next survey was conducted in 2001 wherein 69 countries participated and now CPIS is 
being conducted on an annual basis.  
 
The variables related to the empirical specification of the model in equation (1) include 
investment, trade, optimal investment share in ICAPM, transaction cost, La Porta et al 
(1998) legal indicators and Kaufmann et al (2003) governance indicators. These 
variables are described below: 
 
(a) Investment 
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tjINV ,  is the share of the country s market capitalisation that is invested in country 
. This variable is expected to have negative impact on . This implies that the 
greater the equity investment of country in country , the lesser will be the deviation 
from the benchmark CAPM. This variable is computed using the data on bilateral 
equity holdings from CPIS and the data on stock market capitalisation from the 
International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV).  
'j
i tijBIAS ,
j i
 
(b) Trade 
Trade  is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s 
GDP. Investors are better able to attain accounting and regulatory information on 
foreign markets through trade. Consequently, investors may be inclined to hold the 
stocks of foreign companies with whose products they are most familiar. This variable 
is expected to have negative impact on . The data on imports and exports is 
taken from IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is from World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. 
tijBIAS ,
 
(c)  theortjW ,
theor
tjW ,  is the optimal share of investment in the ICAPM with perfect markets.  is 
the ratio of market capitalization of country to world market capitalization, at time . 
The market capitalisation data is from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges 
(FIBV). 
theor
tjW ,
j t
 
(d) Capital Control: 
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tjRstrict ,  is based on the Miniane (2004) capital account measures. This index is 
expected to have positive impact on Australian investors’ home bias in portfolio equity 
investment against destination countries.  
 
(e) Transaction Cost 
Tran is a measure of transaction costs, derived from Elkins-McSherry Co. Elkins-
McSherry Co. receives trade data on all global trades by institutional traders and 
computes measures of trading costs. The trading cost data comprises of three cost 
components viz. commissions, fees and market impact costs. This paper takes into 
account the total cost comprising of all the three cost components for the year 2001. 
Investors would underweight high transaction cost countries’ in their portfolios. 
Therefore, this variable is expected to have positive impact on . tijBIAS ,
 
(g) Legal Variables 
This paper also investigates the impact of legal indices (La Porta et al (1998) and 
Kaufmann et al (2003)) on . It explores the role of information assymetries that 
arise from differences in accounting standards, disclosure requirements, and regulatory 
environments across countries. These legal indicators are expected to have negative 
impact on .  
tijBIAS ,
tijBIAS ,
 
5 Home Bias Puzzle: Some Stylized Facts 
Table 1 compares the actual share of domestic equities held by Australians in other 
countries with the benchmark share in the world portfolio as per ICAPM model. Actual 
portfolio share is the foreign equity holdings of Australia in other countries relative to 
Australia’s total holdings of foreign and domestic equities. Theoretical portfolio share 
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is country’s market capitalization in the world market capitalization. The table 
indicates that Australia’s actual portfolio share is the highest in US (9.94%) followed 
by UK (1.56%), Netherlands (0.94%), Japan (0.98%), France (0.67%),  Germany 
(0.44%), Hong Kong (0.37%), Switzerland (0.31%) and then, the remaining countries 
of the world. The comparison of the actual holdings to the benchmark shares gives an 
indication of the degree to which Australian investors’ underweight different foreign 
countries. Australian holdings are less than those predicted by ICAPM. There is a 
significant amount of variation in values across countries. The ratio is 0.42 for 
Netherlands indicating that Australian investors’ holding of stocks from Netherlands at 
end-2001 was 42 percent of what traditional portfolio theory would have predicted. 
The degree of underweighting is more severe against countries like Korea and 
Malaysia, where Australian investors hold 2 percent of the shares predicted by 
traditional ICAPM levels.  
 
Figure 1 presents Australia’s home bias measure for 22 foreign countries. The measure 
of Australian investors’ home bias against each country is constructed as one minus the 
ratio of actual to benchmark holdings. The bias measure varies from 0.58 for 
Netherlands to 0.98 for Malaysia.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the plot of countries’ share of portfolio investment in Australia as 
compared to countries’ market capitalisation versus Australia’s equity investment 
home bias against those countries’. New Zealand has a high share of portfolio equity 
investment in Australia, as compared its market capitalisation. On the other hand, 
Korea and Malaysia have a low share of portfolio equity investment in Australia as 
compared to their stock market capitalisations. Australia’s degree of home bias against 
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New Zealand is lower as compared to those of Korea and Malaysia. A striking feature 
of the pattern in Figure 2 is a negative correlation between a country’s propensity to 
invest in Australia and the degree of bias.  
 
Figure 3 presents countries’ trade share in Australia normalized by countries’ GDP 
versus Australia’s homebias against countries’ equity investment. For example, New 
Zealand has close geographical proximity and close affinity in terms of culture, 
language, legal origin, regulatory environment etc. with Australia. Therefore, New 
Zealand has high trade share in Australia and consequently, Australian investors are 
better informed about New Zealand’s investment scenario through its trading relations. 
Australia has a low degree of equity home bias against New Zealand.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the plot of capital controls versus bias. Malaysia has high degree of 
capital controls as compared to United Kingdom and United States. Therefore, 
Australian investors may underweight Malaysia as compared to United Kingdom and 
United States in their portfolio equity. Australia has high degree of homebias against 
Malaysia as compared to United Kingdom and United States.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the plot of relative transaction cost versus bias. Transaction costs 
are plotted relatively to Korea’s transaction cost, which has been adjusted to 1. The 
relative transaction cost of US is very low as compared to Korea. Australian investors 
would underweight countries’ with very high transaction costs in their portfolio equity 
holdings. 
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6 Empirical Results 
Tables 2 to 5 illustrate the regression results for the model associated with equation (1). 
The source country is Australia and the host countries are Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Hong Kong, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
 
In Table 2, column (1), the  variable is negative and significant implying that 
greater the destination countries equity investment in Australia, the lesser will be 
Australia’s homebias against these countries. 100 percent increase in  leads to a 
decrease in Australian investors’ home bias by about 1.8 percent. In column (2), capital 
control variable,  is added.  appears positive but insignificant. The 
positive sign of  implies that greater the destination countries’ restrictions on 
their cross-border equity investments in Australia; greater will be Australia’s degree of 
home bias against the destination countries.  variable is negative but it looses 
significance. In column (3), Trade variable is added, which appears to be negative but 
insignificant. Negative sign of Trade variable implies that greater the trading activities 
between destination countries and Australia, the lesser will be Australia’s portfolio 
equity investment home bias against these countries.  and  variables 
have the same sign as in column (2) and both are insignificant. The results in column 
(3), indicate that , and variables, taken together do not have any 
significant effect on the Australia’s home bias. In column (4), there are two dependent 
jINV
jINV
tjRstrict , tjRstrict ,
tjRstrict ,
jINV
jINV tjRstrict ,
jINV tjRstrict , Trade
 11
variables viz.  and .  is negative and significant implying that greater 
the host countries investment in Australia, the lesser will be Australia’s equity home 
bias against these countries.  appears to be positive; however, it is insignificant. 
This implies that greater the host countries transaction costs, the greater would be 
Australian investors’ equity home bias against these countries. Column (5) adds 
variable , the interaction term of 
jINV Tran jINV
Tran
TC ( )Tran−1  and .  is negative and 
significant implying that greater the host countries investment in Australia, the lesser 
will be Australia’s home bias against these countries. Tran  is positive and significant 
implying that greater the host countries transaction costs, the greater would be the 
Australian investors’ equity home bias against these host countries. TC  is positive and 
significant, implying that countries having high transaction costs are less underweight 
in Australian portfolios. Overall, results in column (5) indicate that investing in 
Australian stock market reduces home bias through reduced transaction costs.     
jINV jINV
 
Table 3 explains the changes in home bias from 2001 to 2003. The paper regresses the 
change in  on the initial level of , and the initial levels of and changes 
in  and .  is negative; however it is insignificant.  is negative 
and significant. This implies that countries that were underweighted by the Australian 
equity investors in 2001 tended to see increases in the equity investments in 2003. 
 is positive; however it is insignificant. Changes in  and  have no 
significant effect on the changes in home bias from 2001 to 2003. 
tijBIAS , tijBIAS ,
jINV
theorW tijBIAS , jINV
theorW jINV
theorW
 
Table 4 illustrates the impact of La Porta et al (1998) variables on in the 
Australian context.  variable is negative and significant, throughout implying that 
tijBIAS ,
jINV
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greater the destination countries equity investment in Australia, the lesser will be 
Australian investors’ homebias against these countries. Individually, the index rule of 
law  is negative but insignificant; and the index efficiency of judicial system 
 is both negative and significant. Column (3) indicates that 100 percent increase 
in the destination countries efficiency of judicial system leads to 2.2 percent decrease 
in Australia’s equity home bias against these countries. Overall the results imply that 
Australian investors’ home bias will decrease against those destination countries that 
have efficient judicial system and high tradition of law and order.  
(RL)
)(EFF
 
Table 5 presents the regression results that show the impact of Kaufmann et al (2003) 
indicators on home bias in the Australian context. On individual basis, Kaufmann et al 
(2003) governance indicators viz. Rule of Law ( )RL , Control of Corruption , 
Government Effectiveness  and Regulatory Quality 
( )CC
(GE) ( )RQ  have negative and 
significant impact on home bias in the Australian context. Regulatory Quality ( ) 
indicator has the greatest impact on home bias. 100 percent increase in destination 
countries regulatory quality environment leads to a decrease in Australia’s equity home 
bias against destination countries by about 12 percent. Column (5) presents the results 
by taking the average of Kaufmann et al (2003) indicators. A 100 percent increase in 
 variable, leads to a decrease in Australia’s equity home bias against destination 
countries’ by about 8.5 percent.  
RQ
AVE
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper employs IMF’s high quality CPIS dataset to investigate the determinants of 
home bias puzzle in the Australian context. The data itself indicates some interesting 
stylized facts about home bias puzzle. 
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 Results indicate evidence of a decrease in Australia’s home bias as the share of 
destination countries stock market that is invested in Australia increases. Capital 
controls are found to have a positive but insignificant impact on the home bias. Trade 
links are found to have a negative but insignificant impact on home bias; implying that 
trade alleviates certain information asymmetries in terms of familiarity with the 
financial and legal environment of the countries; cultural barriers etc. Transaction costs 
are positive and significant; implying that Australian investors underweight the high 
transaction cost countries in their portfolios leading to greater Australia’s bias against 
these countries.  
 
This paper also investigates the impact of La Porta et al (1998) legal variables and 
Kaufman et al (1999) governance indicators on homebias. Australia has low degree of 
homebias against those countries that have an efficient judicial system and high 
tradition of law and order. Kaufman et al (2003) indicators related to government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption have significant 
and negative impact on Australia’s home bias against equity investment in the 
destination countries.  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse causes for the home bias puzzle and to 
derive implications from these findings for economic policy. This paper finds that the 
barriers to the free mobility of equity can arise from two main sources. First, policy 
measures in the form of capital controls can cause barriers to free equity flows. 
Second, even if policy induced barriers to equity flows have been lifted, there remain 
substantial economic or market inherent barriers. These barriers tend to remain 
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relevant and to affect the way in which financial systems operate and integrate even if 
economic policy has reduced regulatory barriers to entry. The asymmetries in 
information between domestic and foreign investors, which can arise from differences 
in regulatory environments, are of primary importance. The market inherent barriers 
due to fixed costs of market entry including transaction costs are also important.  
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Table 1: Australia’s portfolio equity investment 
Countries  Actual (%) portfolio 
share  
 
2001                    
Benchmark 
(%) as per 
ICAPM 
2001             
Actual 
over 
Benchmark
Denmark 0.04 0.34 0.11 
Finland 0.09 0.77 0.11 
France 0.67 4.61 0.14 
Germany 0.44 4.02 0.10 
Greece 0.01 0.31 0.03 
Hungary 0.00 0.03 0.07 
Hong Kong 0.37 1.90 0.19 
Ireland 0.05 0.28 0.17 
Italy 0.18 2.09 0.08 
Japan 0.98 9.84 0.09 
Korea 0.01 0.44 0.02 
Malaysia 0.01 0.47 0.02 
Netherlands 0.94 2.22 0.42 
New Zealand 0.01 0.07 0.14 
Norway 0.02 0.27 0.07 
Singapore 0.11 0.46 0.23 
South Africa 0.05 0.31 0.16 
Spain 0.13 1.44 0.09 
Sweden 0.09 0.93 0.09 
Switzerland 0.31 2.35 0.13 
UK 1.56 8.75 0.17 
US 9.94 54.86            0.18 
 
Source: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS, market capitalizations from FIBV 
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Table 2: Australia’s Home Bias Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
tjINV ,  -0.018 
(-2.775)** 
-0.169 
(-1.068) 
 
-0.154 
(-0.974) 
 
-0.01 
(-1.85)*** 
-0.07 
(-4.04)* 
tjRstrict ,   0.047 
(0.599) 
0.103 
(0.941) 
  
Trade    -0.015 
(-1.218) 
  
Tran     0.00 
(1.36) 
0.00 
(1.74)*** 
TC      0.10 
(2.99)* 
Constant 0.854 
(36.723)* 
0.867 
(23.806)* 
0.861 
(22.452)*
0.77 
(11.00)* 
0.75 
(9.71)* 
Adj R2 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Obs 37 37 37 37 37 
 
Note: ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Change in Australia’s Home Bias from 2001 to 2003 
 
 (1) 
2001Bias  -0.24 
(-0.80) 
2001INV  -0.06 
(-2.73)** 
2001theorW  0.00 
(0.13) 
2001INV∆  0.00 
(0.20) 
2001theorW∆  0.01 
(0.51) 
Constant 0.26 
(0.93) 
Adj R2 0.39 
Obs 37 
 
Note: ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 4: Australia’s Home Bias using La Porta et al (1998) indicators 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
tjINV ,   
 
-0.013 
(-1.816)*** 
 -0.012 
(-1.843)*** 
ROL  -0.016 
(-1.226) 
-0.014 
(-0.990) 
  
EFF    -0.022 
(-1.840)*** 
-0.019 
(-1.522) 
Constant 0.984 
(9.074)* 
0.970 
(8.726)* 
 
1.036 
(10.898)* 
1.021 
(10.256)* 
Adj R2 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.03 
Obs 37 37 37 37 
 
Note: ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. : Rule of Law. ROL EFF : Efficiency of judicial system. 
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Table 5: Australia’s Home Bias using Kaufmann et. al (2003) Indicators 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GE  -0.090 
(-2.114)** 
    
RQ   -0.122 
(-1.987)*** 
   
RL    -0.069 
(-1.798)*** 
  
CC     -0.061 
(-2.144)** 
 
AVE      0.085 
(-
1.767)*** 
Constant 0.98 
(17.46)* 
1.01 
(13.13)* 
 
0.94 
(19.20)* 
0.93 
(26.91)* 
0.95 
(17.27)* 
Adj R2 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.11 
Obs 37 37 37 37 37 
 
Note: ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. GE : Government Effectiveness. : Regulatory Quality. RQ RL : Rule of Law. 
: Control of Corruption.  : Average of  , , CC AVE GE RQ RL  and  CC .   
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Fig 1: Country Bias in Australia’s Equity Holdings 
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Fig 2: Relation between Share of Foreign Market’s Investment in Australia and 
Australia’s Bias 
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Fig 3: Relation between Trade and Australia’s Bias  
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Fig 4: Relation between Capital Control and Australia’s Bias  
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Fig 5: Relation between Relative Transaction Costs and Australia’s Bias 
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